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s a political science graduate, I did my PhD research 
on the political representation of future generations. 
I came across the non-identity problem (NIP) for the 
first time when I was reading the philosophical literature relevant 
for my research. At this time (in 2012), literature on future gen-
erations was almost only found in moral and political philosophy. 
In mainstream political science, nobody seemed (yet) to care, es-
pecially not for academic curiosities such as the NIP. Since the 
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late 1970s, scholars rooted in Anglo-Saxon philosophy had been 
discussing the NIP in relation to the question of whether and how 
we should consider the interests of future generations today.1 It 
has been part of the future generations debate ever since. 
Later on, in an interdisciplinary PhD colloquium with political 
philosopher Geoffrey Brennan as a special guest, I briefly intro-
duced my research topic. It comes as no surprise that the first 
thing Professor Brennan said to me afterwards was that I would 
have to address the NIP in my thesis. Knowing that he was right 
on the philosophical readership side, I did. My supervisors, a po-
litical scientist and a sociologist, though, had less sympathy for 
this. Why would I need to address such a sophistic philosophical 
argument in my political science PhD thesis?, they asked me rhe-
torically. They did not see the relevance of the NIP, which is still 
held dear by the small scientific community I have been speaking 
to with my research. As a compromise, I decided to dedicate three 
pages of my monograph to the NIP and its (non-)relevance for 
my research.2 Still, the verdict of my supervisors was unequivo-
cal. To quote from the first review of my thesis, “the discussion 
of the so-called ‘non-identity problem’ is unusual and difficult to 
approach. This excursus of debate seems completely unnecessary” 
(my translation). 
So, what’s the matter with the NIP? Originating from the ethics 
of reproductive medicine, the NIP travelled to other areas that in-
volve concrete future persons. It states that the actions that cause 
a person’s existence cannot be regarded as morally wrong towards 
this very person, as long as this person has a life that is arguably 
better than not existing at all in the first place. By extension, it is 
then said that policies like environmental pollution are not moral-
ly wrong towards the members of future generations, in so far as, 
first, they causally contribute to the genetic make-up of the future 
persons by somehow affecting the circumstances that determine 
which specific sperms fertilise which ovules and thereby which 
persons are going to exist, and second, these persons will live a 
life worth living, however flawed. It’s only this extended NIP I 
refer to.
Reading these lines, the sympathetic non-philosophical reader 
may well understand my PhD supervisors and doubt whether the 
NIP can really be a serious obstacle to the political considera-
tion of future generations. And I tend to agree. It goes against 
our moral intuition for a reason. Following ethical approaches 
considering individualised persons only – and thus applying the 
NIP – future generations would be morally relevant to us only 
when they would live a life that is worse than being dead (or, to be 
more precise, not being born). Ethically, this is not a particularly 
nuanced view. It implies that we could do almost anything to-
day, and that future generations would not be allowed to morally 
judge our deeds. They would have to accept and support today’s 
status quo in retrospect, since without it they would not exist. 
The NIP therefore always sanctifies the current status quo, which 
is completely arbitrary, not caring for its moral qualities.3 On 
the one hand, the NIP, holding to ridiculously long causality 
chains, supposes that our policies always affect who exactly is 
 going to exist.4 On the other hand, when we hold to the  normative 
truth that every human life is intrinsically equal in value, 
an identity- co- creating effect of ours would not even really 
matter ethically. The NIP gives no guidance on the actually 
 relevant question of how to evaluate the status quo; it does 
not help us to decide  morally what to do for ourselves or for 
future generations. I therefore call the NIP’s moral relevance into 
 question.
If, for the sake of the argument, we assume counterfactually that 
there is a tabula rasa on which there is no current status quo, the 
NIP would not apply and distract us. We would have to decide 
by some other moral standard whether to consider the interests of 
future generations today or not. According to the moral standards 
with which I am familiar, I am quite sure the answer would be 
affirmative.5 Moreover, I suppose that this affirmative argument 
would be more convincing than the NIP’s implicit claim that 
something is morally OK just because it – descriptively – is the 
way it is (i.e. the status quo argument), buying into a naturalistic 
fallacy.
Putting on the more pragmatic political science glasses again, the 
philosophical curiosity of the NIP also loses its relevance when 
it comes to the practice of the political consideration of future 
generations’ interests: the person-specific interests of future gen-
erations cannot be introduced into the political decision-making 
process anyway, since the holders of these interests are not yet in-
dividualised. We are only able to introduce more general interests 
that can be plausibly attributed to future generations. As a matter 
of fact, to a slightly lesser extent this is also true for current citi-
zens: Their interests are usually considered in an aggregated, pro-
cessed and abstracted way. What matters are not the very persons 
with their genes, but the fact that these persons are citizens of a 
certain country, holding equal political rights of being considered 
and represented. Hence, why the NIP is still sticking to the debate 
on representing future generations is probably better explained by 
a philosopher.
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